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I describe myself as a "militant moderate."' Among other things, this
means that I am not given to alarmist, hyperbolic, or rhetorical heat of any
kind; cool understatement is more to my liking. So why do I subtitle this
essay "Notes on How (Not) to Become a Banana Republic"? It will strike
some listeners as inflammatory, the product of a fevered imagination. I
plead guilty only to hyperbole, a time-honored rhetorical device.
Most of what I want to say before getting to the banana republic part
concerns the important relationship of a governmental entity and an individ-
ual officer' s liability to deterrence-and, equally or more important but
much less visible, to the risk of over-deterrence. Almost thirty years ago, in
my maiden book voyage as a torts scholar, I addressed this subject in Suing
Government, a field that I described as "public tort law." 2 (How original
this phrase is, I cannot say for sure, but googling it has given me some
glimmer of pride.) The point of my using this phrase was to emphasize both
the similarities of suits against governmental entities and officials to the
private law of torts and the salient differences-other things being equal.
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University. I wish to thank Fritz
Schwartz, David Schapiro, and Michael Mukasey for comments on earlier drafts, and Andrew
Schalkwyk, Yale Law School class of 2012, for research assistance. A slightly different, unfoot-
noted version of this article appeared in the October- November 2011 issue of Policy Review
under the title "Policymakers in the Dock."
1. PnTR H. SCHUCK, MEDITATIONS OF A MILITANT MODFRATE: COOL Vimws ON HOT Top-
ics 214 (2006).
2. PLTR H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENI: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS XiV
(1983). Much of the rest of this section is taken from the ideas in this book.
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I. PRIVATE AND PUBLIc TORT LAW
Let us begin with the similarities. Both liability systems share the con-
ventional common goals of compensating victims and deterring wrongdo-
ing. To these I added some other goals, which may also be thought of as
constraints on the pursuit of those two master objectives. First, a public tort
system, like a private law system, should affirm, or at least not be inconsis-
tent with, the dominant moral values of the community. This is not to say
that those values are stable; in a dynamic, restless society like ours, they are
subject to change. (Consider, for example, public attitudes toward smoking,
seatbelt use, and homosexuality.) Second, a public tort system, like a pri-
vate one, should be administratively efficient in at least the minimal sense
that it should be cost-effective, assuming that one defines costs and benefits
very broadly, as one should. (Many torts scholars entertain serious doubts
about whether the private tort law system can pass this test,3 but that is
another matter for another day.)
Now, let's examine some of the dissimilarities. Government, as is
widely understood by taxpayers and plaintiffs lawyers alike, has the deepest
pockets of all and thus can assure that judgments against it will be paid,
which is not the case with private tort judgments unless the defendant is
wealthy or adequately insured. This difference probably contributes to cer-
tain features of government liability statutes like the Federal Tort Claims
Act: its preclusion of juries and punitive damages and its restrictions on
plaintiffs' legal fees (which presumably and, in my view, improperly limits
their access to the courts). The public fisc, so the argument would go, is
simply such an inviting litigation target that its attractiveness must be lim-
ited-like a honey pot guarded by nettlesome bees.
Perhaps, however, the most important difference between private and
public tort law-the one that I shall emphasize here-concerns the impor-
tance of the goal of encouraging vigorous decision-making and appropriate
risk-taking. ("Appropriate" is a question-begging word, and in this context
appropriately so.) This goal is valuable in both domains, to be sure, and I do
not want to exaggerate the differences. Still, the need to promote vigorous
decision-making and appropriate risk-taking-or putting it another way, to
discourage undue timidity-is more central for official actors for several
reasons. If a private firm decides that the liability regime makes the risk of
having to compensate potential victims low enough in light of the action's
potential benefits, it will undertake the action-whether the action is manu-
facturing a product, undertaking a medical intervention, driving a car, or
buying machinery for the workplace. Such decisions will have some effects
on third parties, of course-the product will be available for purchase to
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WILIH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS (1989); PETER A. BELL &
JEREY O'CONNELI, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS oF TORT LAW (1999).
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other consumers, the medical treatment may improve (or impair) the lives
of the patients' family members, the car may injure others, and so forth-
but the effects of those actions and of the adjudication of rights and dam-
ages that may result will largely be internalized by the two parties. In that
sense, the "only" public value implicated by such disputes is the social de-
sire for corrective justice. If the private tort rules induce the potential injurer
not to act-not to produce a widget or take that car trip-it is largely a
matter of indifference to the rest of us. If the product is not a widget but a
potentially life-saving drug-or the car trip is to the hospital or voting
place-the social effects of the action will of course be that much greater
and the difference between public and private stakes in the decision will be
that much less.
Ordinarily, the social calculus should be quite different when the puta-
tive actor is a government official, especially the kind that political scientist
Michael Lipsky aptly termed "street-level bureaucrats":' police officers on
the beat, schoolteachers, social workers, drug enforcement agents, and the
like. These officials must make difficult decisions with large effects on the
public, little time for reflection, and inadequate information. (This is not
always the case, of course; deciding whether to issue a parking ticket is
neither a tough call nor one of great social moment.) If street-level officials
are to act, their actions will often involve coercion (and less often violence),
which increases the risk that they will violate someone's legal rights and be
subject to vehement complaint, bureaucratic discipline, or litigation. Such
an individual official, like her private sector counterparts, will consider the
costs and benefits of her two choices: whether to act or not and, if she will
act, whether to act in one way rather than another. As citizens, we should
want the official who makes this assessment to consult not only her selfish
interests but also to consider her official duties, her responsibilities to the
public, her professional norms, and so forth.
But suppose that the government official chooses inaction. Here is the
central difference, for our purposes, between her situation and that of her
private counterpart. If she fails to act when she "should" act, significant
public interests are sacrificed; whereas if her private counterpart chooses
inaction, the risks of that choice ordinarily fall only on it alone. (Again,
there are exceptions as with the life-saving drug.) Some public functions are
governmental monopolies, others provide collective goods that only gov-
ernment can supply, and still others involve special duties of protection that
discourage private substitutes. If the official doesn't act as she should in
these situations, no one else can or will. When, then, should she act? In
general, she should act when she either is under a duty to act (as in the case
of a police officer who has reason to believe that a crime is afoot) or when
4. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREIT LEVEL BURIAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PU-
LIc SERVICES xi (1983).
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discretionary action would advance the public interest (as in the case of a
police officer who must decide whether to drive the squad car down a par-
ticularly dangerous block instead of continuing down the safer main
avenue).
Two other differences between private and public tort law also affect
vigorous decision-making: the set of incentives that shape the individual's
behavior and the choices that are available to her. The most important in-
centive differential is that private actors can be compensated for taking on
additional, profit-increasing risk, while public officials ordinarily cannot.
This difference mainly reflects the difference between private and public
compensation systems, which in turn reflect a somewhat different mix of
goals and constraints. Private systems, at least in principle, are flexible
enough to reward employees who take risks that advance the firm's inter-
ests. Public systems, however, tend to be far more rigid and categorical,
which prevents street-level officials from appropriating any of the social
value that may flow from greater risk-taking on their part; indeed, such
appropriation might be thought undesirable or even corrupt. For such offi-
cials, then, taking greater risks in pursuit of the public good is essentially all
pain and no gain.
If public officials have fewer self-interested incentives than their pri-
vate counterparts to act boldly in the public interest, they also have more
options for avoiding such action or minimizing the risks that action might
entail-largely because they are generally less closely supervised than their
private employee counterparts. First, officials can simply refrain from act-
ing in situations where they should act, especially if they think that neither
their superiors nor those harmed by their passivity will observe their inac-
tion. Second, they can delay their decisions-for example, by seeking their
superiors' approval or more information before they act. Third, they can
retreat to formalism and its cognates, legalism and ritualism; here, they
comply with a rule in a way that simplifies their task and reduces their
personal exposure but that often defeats the rule's underlying purpose. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, officials who face asymmetric risks of criti-
cism and liability may have enough discretion to choose relatively riskless
actions over relatively risky ones, even if this choice is socially perverse.
Consider a social worker who faces the difficult choice of removing a child
from a troubled home or leaving him with his parents in hopes of preserving
the family. Assume that she is more likely to be criticized (or sued) if she
leaves the child with his parents, who then abuse him, than she would be if
she placed the child in foster care. In close cases and at the margin, her self-
interested motive might outweigh (ambiguous) professional norms and be
20111 499
UNIVERSITY OF ST THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
decisive in the removal. Such asymmetric risk structures are very common
in life, especially in the public service.5
These differences in incentives, choices, and monitoring create greater
principal-agent problems than in the private sector, thus making it easier for
the low-level official to finesse her duty and protect her self-interest by not
acting vigorously. In addition, this agency problem is magnified because
the substantive criterion for deciding what to do-the content of her duty, if
you will-is much more opaque than that of her private counterpart, whose
lodestar is firm profit maximization. (I am not suggesting that the profit
criterion is always clear enough to dictate specific actions, only that it is
much clearer than that of "order maintenance," "public safety," "sound edu-
cation," and other public law goals.) This ambiguity provides greater scope
for the official to compromise the vigorous decision-making/appropriate
risk-taking goals through self-protective choices.
If I have gone on at length in this analysis, it is because I believe it is
vital to establish public law's special and compelling reasons to be con-
cerned about the costs to society that officials' incentives for self-protection
can inflict. We must also think long and hard before we urge courts or
legislatures to do anything that will tend to increase those incentives and
costs.
II. THE DIFFERENCE THAT 9/11 HAS MADE
This concern about official self-protection is greatly heightened in a
post-9/11 world. In this world, the need for bold, aggressive, official action
to avert serious threats is greater than ever. It is, nevertheless, also a world
in which officials have more reason than ever to fear that they will be se-
verely criticized, arraigned before the court of public opinion, and perhaps
even sued for damages if they make a decision that was arguably wrong or
that may seem wrong with the benefit of the hindsight afforded by a calmer
and less dangerous environment. Officials can also anticipate that if they
are indeed sued over such a decision, they may well face ruinous personal
and financial costs-even if the government agrees to defend them and they
ultimately prevail.
Why are such suits more likely in today's heated political and legal
climate than they were in the past? First, the stakes are higher. Because we
face a constant threat to public safety, we must significantly rely-for better
and for worse-on public officials to protect us. This reliance is simply a
fact of life; it does not depend on one's views about how to combat terror,
the scope of human rights, or the limits of governmental power.
5. SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 57 (citing Don Bellante & Albert N. Link, Are Public Sector




Second, national security demands that many official decisions be
veiled for some period of time. Transparency is almost always a virtue in a
democracy, but occasionally it must yield to secrecy-although one hopes
that this yielding is only narrow and temporary. Once unveiled, secrecy
seems, and sometimes is, sinister, inviting legal challenge of the underlying
action. Again, hindsight is not always a reliable guide to resolving such
challenges.
Third, the legal standards that are supposed to govern official conduct
in this area-for example, "torture," "material assistance," or "threat"-are
often maddeningly murky. Judicial interpretations of the relevant phrases
often deepen rather than dispel this murkiness. This legal uncertainty also
means that both sides can usually muster respectable legal arguments for
their positions.
Fourth, courts are more likely to be uncomfortable with how officials
conduct the war on terrorism, which often involves practices-preventive
detention, interrogation, isolation, rendition, secret evidence, special tribu-
nals, limits on counsel, Guantanamo, and so forth-that go right up to the
line of legality, as conventionally understood, and arguably may cross that
line. The fact that Congress often supports the presidency in these particular
policy settings could affect the courts in different ways. Judges may be
more inclined to defer to the other branches' greater political responsibili-
ties, but it may also increase judges' sense of isolation, perhaps intensifying
their felt duty to rein in the other two branches in the name of the Constitu-
tion, especially given the open-ended time frame of the war on terror. This
latter dynamic may have influenced the Supreme Court's decision in
Boumediene and other post-9/11 rulings on these national security issues.'
Finally, controversial national security policies raise difficult and
deeply contested empirical issues (e.g., costs, benefits, and degree of effec-
tiveness) and normative tradeoffs (e.g., security, liberty, and diplomacy),
but the salience and weight of these empirical and normative judgments
vary over time. This is especially true today, more than a decade after 9/11,
when the public's fear of violent attack has receded somewhat. With the
ostensible abatement of the emergency, both the public and the courts tend
to give greater weight to the temporarily-subordinated, but usually domi-
nant, rule-of-law values as conventionally understood, which a liberty-lov-
ing public reveres and of which the courts conceive themselves to be the
primary institutional guardians.
Taken together, then, I suspect that these post-9/11 developments mag-
nify officials' already significant anxieties about the risks of being punished
in one way or another for decisions that they made or influenced earlier
when they were participants in the war against terrorism. Are these anxie-
6. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The others are Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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ties well-founded, or are they merely pretenses enabling officials to avoid
responsibility for their misconduct? I believe that, first, these litigation anx-
ieties are, indeed, often well-founded; and second, even-or especially-if
officials exaggerate the risk of such sanctions, it can do great harm to the
polity.
III. THE CASE OF PADILLA V. YOO
The tortuous path of the "torture memos" is a long and winding road
that shows no signs of reaching its destination.' In 2002, lawyers in the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") prepared these legal
analyses at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency as the Bush ad-
ministration developed new detention and interrogation policies regarding
suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists captured abroad.' The memos
concluded that the prolonged detention, isolation, and a wide range of harsh
interrogation techniques (including waterboarding, most notoriously) that
the CIA wanted to use on a small number of "enemy combatants" were
legally permissible.' The memos were also forwarded to the Attorney Gen-
eral, other senior Justice Department officials, and senior White House staff
who, along with the CIA, presumably relied on them in framing their
policies. 10
The principal drafter of the early memos was John Yoo. A graduate of
Harvard College and Yale Law School; former Senate staffer; former U.S.
Supreme Court clerk; prolific scholar on issues of separation of powers,
international law, and the law of war and national security; and professor at
Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, Yoo is a
leading exponent of broad presidential powers in wartime subject to limited
or no judicial review. (Disclosure: Yoo was my student at Yale in the early
1990s, and I consider him a friend.) Jay Bybee, his boss, the head of the
OLC at the time, and now a federal court of appeals judge, reviewed and
signed the memos. The memos aroused enormous controversy from the mo-
ment the first one was leaked in June 2004; the Obama administration pub-
lished them in 2009, and harsh criticism continues unabated to this day
from many quarters. Some attack the memos' legal analysis; others de-
nounce the Bush administration's policy decisions to engage in the author-
ized practices; and still others criticize the bureaucratic politics and secrecy
surrounding them.
On June 12, 2009, Judge Jeffrey White of the federal district court in
San Francisco issued an opinion refusing to dismiss a lawsuit against Yoo
brought by Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen who was convicted in 2007 of aiding
7. Much of the analysis that follows in this section is taken from Peter H. Schuck, Immunity,
Not Impunity, AM. LAW., Nov. 2009, at 51.





terrorists and sentenced to more than 17 years." Padilla (and his mother,
who also sued) had sought nominal damages and a declaration that Yoo
violated Padilla's constitutional rights by rendering opinions and formulat-
ing policies that allegedly set in motion Padilla's illegal interrogation and
detention.12 Yoo has appealed Judge White's decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which as of November 6, 2011 was still hold-
ing the case in abeyance while considering the applicability to Yoo's case
of the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd" on the scope of
immunity from Bivens lawsuits. (Al-Kidd involves an allegedly pretextual
use of the material witness statute against a detainee, which in any event
could be readily distinguished from Yoo's situation.)' 4 For reasons that I
shall now explain, I believe that the Ninth Circuit should and will reject the
claims against Yoo at the threshold.
This lawsuit and Judge White's decision upholding it are ill-conceived
for at least three distinct reasons: legal principles, public policy, and profes-
sional ethics. I take this view even though I am willing to concede arguendo
the main criticisms leveled at Yoo's memos: that they got the law wrong at
key points, were sometimes sloppily and superficially reasoned, and were
intended to justify a desired outcome-in the sense that, as when lawyers
counsel clients in the typical case, the clients ask how close they can get to
the legal line without transgressing it. (If I am right, of course, it follows
that officials like Yoo should not be prosecuted criminally where the stan-
dard of proof and the necessity of showing the requisite mens rea would be
much higher and the sanctions more severe.)
A. Legal Principles
Even assuming that these criticisms of the memos are correct, the
long-standing law of official immunity requires that Yoo be protected from
civil liability-unless he is denied the immunity on the ground that the
court finds that the governing law on the particular issue was so clearly
established that in giving the contrary advice, he should or must have
known that it was erroneous and would violate the plaintiff's legal rights."
This "clearly established law" standard, which the Court has worked out
over decades, may sometimes be difficult to apply-in hard cases, clarity is
in the eye of the beholder-but it does strike roughly the correct balance
between the competing public and private interests. For Padilla to overcome
Yoo's immunity claim, then, he must do much more than demonstrate that
Yoo's legal conclusion (not just his reasoning) was wrong and violated his
legal rights-although even this will be difficult to do. He must also show
11. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
12. Id. at 1013-19.
13. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
14. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
15. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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that (1) Yoo could not reasonably have believed that his legal advice was
correct because the law was so clearly to the contrary, and (2) this errone-
ous advice was the proximate cause of Padilla's alleged torture.1 6
Padilla cannot meet this standard. His legal obstacles begin with the
insufficiency of his complaint. In considering Yoo's motion to dismiss, of
course, Judge White had to assume the truth of Padilla's factual allegations.
The Supreme Court, however, held two years ago in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly" that assumed facts do not suffice without more to advance a
plaintiff's claims to trial. To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must show that the
link between his alleged facts and his legal theory is more than conceivable;
it must be "plausible on its face." Then, only three weeks before Judge
White's decision in Padilla v. Yoo, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Twombly
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal," which dismissed a complaint alleging, as Padilla does
against Yoo, unconstitutional detention and interrogation after 9/11. (Justice
Souter and three others dissented.) As in its other official immunity deci-
sions, the Court reiterated the need to head off burdensome discovery and
trial unless the plaintiff can make a plausible threshold showing of liability.
Judge White, however, did not even bother to distinguish Iqbal.
Even with the benefit of discovery, however, Padilla would be unable
to make the requisite showing. Consider the evidentiary obstacles he would
face-quite apart from having to overcome Yoo's strong immunity defense
(discussed again below). He would have to prove that Yoo, rather than By-
bee (not a defendant and now a federal judge), was responsible for the al-
legedly wrong advice in the memos; that he did not reasonably rely on
information provided to him by the CIA about the techniques; that the lay-
ers of Yoo's superiors (all fine lawyers) who reviewed and transmitted the
advice upward did not endorse it and take the responsibility on themselves
(i.e., did not become a "supervening cause" of what ensued); and that Yoo's
advice was the actual and proximate cause of the policy decisions that Pa-
dilla challenges. To prove actual and proximate cause, Padilla would also
have to show that Yoo's advice dominated the many other factors that must
have influenced President George W. Bush and his military, intelligence,
and political advisers in the decision to use the challenged techniques.
In order to establish these things, moreover, Padilla would presumably
have to take depositions of President Bush, the Attorney General, and their
top staff members and subpoena their internal deliberative documents,
which would surely be privileged. Judge White brushed aside these and
other legal obstacles, reasoning that all of them were matters to be devel-
oped through discovery, even though the Court in Twombly and Iqbal had
rejected precisely this reasoning, stating:
16. Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 970.
17. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
18. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
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It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitle-
ment to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the dis-
covery process through careful case management given the
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in check-
ing discovery abuse has been on the modest side."
Assuming that Padilla could somehow hurdle these threshold legal ob-
stacles, he would face three other formidable ones. First, he must show that
the tight restrictions that the Court has long imposed on the right to bring
Bivens actionS20 -damage actions against individual federal officials for
constitutional violations-should be relaxed in this case. In the four de-
cades of Bivens actions, however, the Court has allowed such claims to
proceed in only two situations, none since Carlson v. Green in 1980.21
Neither of the allowed claims was remotely like the claims in Yoo.2 2 It is
also noteworthy that although Congress has legislated twice on the treat-
ment of detainees since 9/11 and the disclosures about detainee mistreat-
ment at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, it has never created a tort remedy of this
kind.23 Moreover, the standard that a Bivens plaintiff must satisfy-that
there are no "special factors counseling [sic] hesitation"24 in allowing a
damage remedy against an individual official rather than suing under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 25-cannot be met in a case like Yoo, in
which serious legal and factual difficulties abound. Once again, Judge
White waved this caselaw aside, dismissing in one sentence the closest pre-
cedent-a recent D.C. Circuit decision denying a Bivens remedy to plain-
tiffs with claims similar to Padilla's-simply because those plaintiffs were
19. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 559).
20. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
21. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). See generally, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to extend Bivens since Carlson).
22. For a critique of the Court's interpretation of Bivens in this context, see, e.g., Stephen
Viadeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEwIs & CLARK L. REv. 255 (2010).
Vladeck's argument is that if a Bivens action is the only likely source of relief, the courts can use
other doctrines to reject such claims if the circumstances warrant, and thus the Bivens limitations
on justiciability should not be used to cut off the claims prematurely at the threshold. In another
article for this symposium volume, Vladeck and his co-author argue that even if no Bivens claim is
available, Padilla can sue Yoo and other officials under state tort law. Stephen Vladeck, Bivens
Remedies and the Myth of the "Heady Days," 8 U. Si. THOMAs L.J. 514 (2011).
23. In the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2008, Congress did seek to limit interrogation
techniques available to the CIA to only those contained in the U.S. Army Field Manual, which
does not allow waterboarding. H.R. 2082, 110th Cong. § 327 (2008). President Bush vetoed the
bill because of this provision, and his veto was sustained in Congress. Bill Overview, Gov-
TRACK.Us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-2082 (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
24. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
25. Padilla could have sued under the FTCA but presumably would lose because of any of
four exceptions: discretionary functions, intentional torts, arising out of combatant activities dur-
ing time of war, or arising in a foreign country. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (h), (j), (k) (2011). In each
instance, the outcome would depend on how certain statutory terms were interpreted.
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detained abroad while Padilla was detained here, which is, or should be, an
irrelevant distinction in the case against Yoo.
Second, Padilla must show that Yoo's memos were wrong as a matter
of law. Given the ambiguity of international instruments, domestic statutes,
and judicial precedents on this point at that time (and even now), this will
be a challenging, though not impossible, task. Although some legal scholars
disparage Yoo's analysis and conclusion, 2 6 others-some liberal,2 7 some
more conservative28-accept Yoo's conclusion while disputing some of his
legal analysis. 29 Notably, Congress has refused on several occasions to de-
fine and prohibit waterboarding as torture, and at least one circuit court has
defined torture under the Convention Against Torture in a way that likely
would exclude waterboarding from the definition." Again, the point is not
that Yoo's conclusion on this question was ultimately correct-I express no
opinion here on that question-but only that it was genuinely arguable at
the time and remains arguable today.
The third and most important obstacle is official immunity, discussed
briefly above. The Court has insisted both on protecting officials' good
faith decisions even when erroneous (if they were not erroneous, of course,
they would not need the immunity) and on ensuring in immunity-worthy
cases that this shield operates at the threshold before the official is sub-
jected to the burdens of discovery, the financial costs and trauma of litiga-
tion, the risks of potential liability, and the temptation to reduce those risks
by testifying in ways that compromise legitimate governmental secrets
("graymail"). 3 1 The Court's reason for granting such protection is certainly
26. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 Coitum. J. TRANSNAT'I, L.
641, 647-48 (2005); Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 175, 222
(2006); Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45
Coiu M. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 504-06 (2007).
27. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the "War on Terrorism," 1 J.
NA'L SEC. L. & POL. 285, 287-91 (2005) (explaining that the United States' derogation from the
Convention Against Torture (CAT)'s ban on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment turned the
distinction between torture and such treatment into a live legal issue with regards to treatment not
on US soil); Sanford Levinson, In Quest of a "Common Conscience": Reflections on the Current
Debate About Torture, I J. NAT I Snc. L. & Poi. 231, 242 (2005) (conceding but criticizing
Senate's derogation from CAT's definition of torture, and arguing that the debate should go be-
yond the boundary line between torture and non-torture).
28. See, e.g., JACK GoLDSMITH, Tun TERROR PRESIDENCY 141-76 (2007); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1812-13
(2009).
29. At least one scholar argues that individual liability, civil or criminal, is not necessary to
hold officials responsible for their wrongful legal advice. Stephen I. Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the
Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law after Bush, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK iHE LAW:
THE Rui I or LAW AND THE PRosEciTION or THV BusH ADMINISTRATION 183, 205-06 (Austin
Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010).
30. Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining that
CAT requires "a showing of specific intent before the court can make a finding that a petitioner
will be tortured.").




not any judicial solicitude for the individual official. Rather, the Court's
concern is for the public's interest in fearless, vigorous decision-making by
officials who must exercise often delicate judgment under highly con-
strained conditions. Thus, to overcome the immunity claim, Padilla must
prove not just that Yoo violated his legal rights but that the violated right
was "clearly established" as a matter of law, implying either that Yoo wrote
his memos in bad faith or that he was so obtuse that he failed to reach a
legal conclusion that was obvious to all.
Even if some of Yoo's legal analysis turns out to be wrong, how can
Padilla possibly show that Yoo did not believe in the truth of his own analy-
sis and indeed knew that it was manifestly wrong? Critics say many nasty
things about Yoo and his views, but few assert that he did not believe in the
principles he avowed or that he eschewed the rule of law. He simply inter-
preted the law differently than they do-and in their view, wrongly.32 On
this point, consider the context in which Yoo worked as described by for-
mer Chief Judge and Attorney General Michael Mukasey:
The difficulty and novelty of the legal questions these lawyers
confronted is scarcely mentioned; indeed, the vast majority of the
criticism is unaccompanied by any serious legal analysis. In addi-
tion, it is rarely acknowledged that those public servants were
often working in an atmosphere of almost unimaginable pressure,
without the academic luxury of endless time for debate. Equally
ignored is the fact that, by all accounts I have seen or heard, in-
cluding but not limited to Jack Goldsmith's book, those lawyers
reached their conclusions in good faith based upon their best
judgments of what the law required.
Consider also the findings of an analysis by New York Times reporters
Scott Shane and David Johnston published in June 2009.34 They wrote that
many Justice Department lawyers reviewing the legal arguments for the
harsh interrogation techniques in 2005, including Deputy Attorney General
James Comey, who strongly opposed using them as a matter of policy, con-
cluded that the techniques were lawful. (Comey, of course, is widely
praised for his integrity and professionalism-for example, in the infamous
unseemly effort by White House officials to pressure the then-hospitalized
Attorney General, John Ashcroft, to reauthorize President Bush's domestic
surveillance program.) The Times article also detailed how later OLC direc-
tors Jack Goldsmith and Daniel Levin, while withdrawing Yoo's memo,
32. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Alas, No Disciplinary Action; Torture Memo Authors Are
Immune Since It's Hard to Prove Bad Faith or Incompetence, 31 NAT'i L.J. 38 (2009). Morrison
urges that a new remedy for lawyer incompetence be established, but he does not claim that it
would condemn Yoo in this case.
33. Michael B. Mukasey, Remarks at the Boston College Law School Commencement (May
23, 2008).
34. Scott Shane & David Johnston, U.S. Lawyers Agreed on the Legality of Brutal Tactic,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 2009, at Al.
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accepted the legality of those techniques (including, in Levin's case,
waterboarding) even as they opposed their use on policy grounds and found
some of Yoo's earlier analysis to be sloppy."
These techniques, it seems, yielded a great deal of valuable informa-
tion that surely saved the lives of many Americans and others. Attorney
General Mukasey continues:
We learned a great deal through the CIA program. In fact, you
can focus on only three of the detainees-Abu Zubaydah, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, and Abdel Rahim al Nashiri-and see a huge
trove of valuable information. . . . Not only did [Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed] disclose general information on how Al-Q[aeda]
moved money and people, but also specific information that
helped disrupt other plots, including one involving airplanes, this
one directed against the library tower in Los Angeles that was to
be carried out by a south Asian group . . . . Other information
received from [Khalid Sheik Mohammed] resulted in the capture
of people involved in a plan to develop a biological weapons ca-
pability in the United States, and on and on.36
Whether the clear life-saving value of these techniques is or should be rele-
vant to their legality-whether Kantian or consequentialist assessments
should control our legal definition of torture-is a hard and important ques-
tion that deserves robust public debate. For present purposes, the key point
is that this question clearly was open when the memos were written.
On January 23, 2012, the Fourth Circuit considered Padilla's Bivens
claim against top Defense Department officials based on the same theories
on which he had sued Yoo.3 1 (In this Fourth Circuit case, Padilla has
dropped Yoo and other legal professionals as defendants, along with medi-
cal personnel and interrogators). Because the court refused to allow a Biv-
ens claim, it did not need to reach the issue of qualified immunity. For
these reasons, I expect the Ninth Circuit to agree.
B. Public Policy
There is a good reason why the Supreme Court insists on broad immu-
nity for all but clearly established and knowing violations of law-and this
reason is not an exception to the rule of law but is an essential element of it.
Society depends on mid-level officials like Yoo to give their superiors (and
us) their best judgment on difficult issues without having to worry about
being dragged into court or disbarred if they turn out to be wrong, or (in the
case of criminal prosecution) when a new administration arrives in Wash-
ington. The public interest is compromised when such officials pull their
35. Some more liberal legal scholars have also taken roughly this position. See, e.g., Schep-
pele, supra note 28, at 287-91; Levinson, supra note 28, at 242.
36. Mukasey, supra note 8.
37. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012).
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analytical punches in anticipation of having to defend possible Bivens ac-
tions. Immunity in these circumstances benefits us; if it also benefits offi-
cials like Yoo, that is incidental. Given the punch-pulling alternative, it is
simply the lesser of two evils.
The legal immunity to which I believe Yoo is entitled in this case, of
course, cannot immunize him from other more informal sanctions and costs.
The Justice Department, having perceived a potential conflict of interest in
representing him, ceased doing so. It agreed instead to pay a private lawyer
for Yoo at an hourly rate far below what the best of them charge, especially
in the hothouse legal environment of Washington, D.C. Fortunately for
Yoo, a conservative legal eminence, Miguel Estrada, offered to represent
Yoo pro bono. Had Estrada not been willing to do so, Yoo's defense costs
could be financially ruinous-even if Yoo wins his case. Yoo is lucky to
have Estrada in his corner, of course, but how many officials can count on
pro bono representation by a top lawyer who is prepared to take up the
heavy burden simply in order to vindicate a principle? Putting officials at
risk of personal bankruptcy-whether or not they later prevail in court-is
not only manifestly unfair to them; but, more importantly, it will tend to
discourage top-flight lawyers from going into public service.
C. Professional Ethics
There has been much talk among Yoo's critics of disbarring him and
other officials who gave legal advice that some other lawyers and lay peo-
ple find abhorrent." Some of these critics claim that his client was the na-
tion, not the President-as if this would make a difference, given that the
President speaks for the nation. In reality, this is an effort to find scapegoats
for Bush administration policies that many Americans fervently opposed-
and that contributed to his party being driven from office in the 2008 elec-
tions. (The fact that the Obama administration has reinstituted most of these
policies, though not waterboarding," is only one of the many ironies of this
episode.) Lawyers should not be severely punished for writing arguably
sloppy or faulty memos, much less for being on the wrong side of history-
which in this case, of course, has not yet been finally written. Obama's
Department of Justice leadership was right to reject the idea of seeking
professional sanctions against Yoo. It is one thing to disagree strenuously
with a lawyer's view of the law; it is quite another to say that he has tra-
38. E.g., Stephen Gillers, The Torture Memos, NATION, Apr. 28, 2008; Jack Balkin, Did Yoo
and Bybee Violate Canons of Professional Ethics?, BALKIN Bi OGSPOT (Apr. 12, 2008), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2008/04/did-yoo-and-bybee-violate-canons-of.html; Scott Horton, A Re-
sponse to Dean Edley, BALKIN BLOGSPOT (Apr. 12, 2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/04/
response-to-dean-edley.html; Glen Greenwald, John Yoo's War Crimes, SALON (Apr. 2, 2008),
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenngreenwald/2008/04/02yoo.
39. Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama, in Reversal, Clears Way for Guantanamo Trials to
Resume, N.Y. Tims, Mar. 8, 2011, at Al.
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duced the rule of law and must be banished from its precincts. A profes-
sional ethic worthy of the name knows the difference.
Protecting officials from being sued personally over good faith legal
and policy disagreements does not place them above the law. Rather, it
preserves the fine line between law and politics as well as between legal
sanctions and legitimate disagreement about law and policy. This line is
essential for the integrity and vitality of each. If government lawyers' ad-
vice turns out to be wrong or illegal, they will suffer the obloquy, fairly or
unfairly, of having rendered it as well as the reputational, professional, and
other sanctions that may follow it. In Yoo's case, he has been constantly
harassed and his classes picketed, since he returned to Boalt Law School to
teach more than five years ago and many faculty and students at the univer-
sity have publicly demanded his ouster. They have a perfect right to do so,
of course, but such harassment can only increase officials' disincentives to
engage in the kinds of vigorous decision-making and appropriate risk-tak-
ing that are needed to protect vital public interests. One response to this
disturbing reality is to say that this demonization simply comes with the
territory; to borrow from Harry Truman, if government lawyers can't take
the heat, they should stay out of the kitchen. This response, however, is too
easy; it will simply encourage our government lawyers to serve up pablum
instead of following more controversial recipes. A better answer is for those
who criticize the lawyer's decision to continue to vigorously argue their
positions but to make their arguments in public deliberative fora with a
decent respect for the difficulty of such legal questions-in short, to turn on
the light but turn down the heat.
IV. THE FUTURE
Government officials, like almost everyone else, are risk-averse-
maybe even more so.40 Other things being equal, and given the asymmetric
incentives that those who must make controversial decisions or recommen-
dations face, even a small risk of being sued or prosecuted (and if a lawyer,
disbarred) over those decisions or recommendations would tend to induce
rational officials to hunker down, cover their rears, hedge their bets, and
pull their punches. Encouraging timorous self-protection on the part of offi-
cials to whom we entrust with the most delicate balancing of our vital inter-
ests and values is the last thing that a sound legal system should do.
As it happens, we have been there before. Professor and former OLC
Director Jack Goldsmith traces what he calls "cycles of timidity and aggres-
sion" in official and public attitudes toward the intelligence community and
its work. Political leaders, he says:
Pressure the community to engage in controversial action at the
edges of the law and then fail to protect it from recriminations
40. SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 68-71.
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when things go awry. This leads the community to retrench and
become risk averse, which invites complaints by politicians that
the community is fecklessly timid. Intelligence excesses of the
1960s led to the Church committee reproaches and reforms of the
1970s, which led to complaints that the community had become
too risk-averse, which led to the aggressive behavior under Wil-
liam Casey in the 1980s that resulted in the Iran-Contra and re-
lated scandals, which led to another round of intelligence purges
and restrictions in the 1990s that deepened the culture of risk
aversion and once again led (both before and after 9/11) to com-
plaints about excessive timidity.4 1
As Mukasey notes, "that pendulum is now swinging back once again."42
This is to be expected in a society like ours, committed to both security and
liberty. We must look to the law to regulate and adjust the tension between
them in light of current realities, social needs, and imperishable values.
There is much room for reasonable, professional, and patriotic disagreement
about where the balance should be struck and which legal forms that bal-
ance should take. For example, if we conclude that detainees like Padilla
deserve a monetary damage remedy for wrongful treatment in detention, it
may be better to create such a remedy against the United States under the
FTCA or some special statute, so long as the government retains a properly-
designed defense for good faith discretionary policy judgments that turn out
to be erroneous.43 In cases where individual officials like Yoo acted within
the scope of their authority, broadly defined,44 a remedy directly against the
United States would strike a better balance between the goals of compensa-
tion and optimal deterrence than a Bivens remedy against individual offi-
cials like Yoo would. If we are primarily concerned with setting the record
straight and assessing official conduct rather than providing a monetary
remedy, then the appointment of a governmental investigative body or a
private blue-ribbon fact-finding commission may be appropriate.45 The pre-
cise form that the responses to particular instances of alleged official mis-
conduct should take, of course, is an important question that deserves more
careful assessment than I can give it here.
The law of governmental and official liability is the fulcrum of that
necessary, delicate balance. One hallmark of a banana republic is that offi-
cials realistically fear that they will face criminal prosecution and exile if
and when the opposing party gains office. This is one reason, of course,
41. GoiDSMITH, supra note 28, at 163.
42. Mukasey, supra note 33.
43. SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 113-14.
44. The law of official and governmental immunity defines "scope of authority" in terms of
whether the official was authorized to make that kind of decision, not whether the decision was
legally correct. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
45. There are many precedents for this, including the review of the World War II Japanese
internment, discussed in Vladeck, supra note 29.
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why autocratic leaders so desperately hang on to power. Fear of personal
ruin, however, can do great damage even in a genuine democracy like ours.
At the margin, where good and evil inevitably do their work, even a small
risk of serious personal sanctions against officials is enough to deform our
democracy, unleashing a new cycle-not just of timidity and aggression but
also of political vengeance-that we cannot readily control. Except in cases
of demonstrable criminality, let us reserve our reprisals, principled as well
as unprincipled, for elections.
